| Encrypted DNS (OMB M-22-09) |
“Agencies must resolve DNS queries using encrypted DNS wherever it is technically supported.” Agency resolvers must support DNS over HTTPS or DNS over TLS and use them upstream; endpoints must enable encrypted DNS in applications and the operating system where available and be explicitly configured to use agency-designated resolvers; gaps go in the zero trust plan, with enterprise-wide support by FY 2024 |
Ch 03, Ch 05 |
Resolver DoT and DoH configuration (DoQ where supported); endpoint DNS policy; rules that block port 853 and public DoH resolvers |
| Protective DNS for egress (OMB M-22-09; CISA Encrypted DNS Implementation Guidance; CISA Protective DNS) |
Agencies “are already required to have DNS requests routed through CISA-operated infrastructure,” and M-22-09 directed CISA’s Protective DNS to support encrypted DNS and scale to cloud and mobile use. The CISA service is a recursive resolver upstream of agency networks that blocks, redirects or sinkholes queries matching threat indicators and alerts the agency; it doesn’t interfere with internal DNS |
Ch 03, Ch 05, Ch 08 |
Forwarding-chain configuration; redirect-dns targets; resolver logs showing the governed path |
| DNS logging (OMB M-21-31) |
Passive DNS is an EL1 (Basic) requirement, due within one year of the memo: agencies “shall implement a Domain Name System (DNS) logging system,” including requests made over encrypted DNS, with analytics that identify the host that sourced each query; DNS query and response logs are among the required log categories |
Ch 03, Ch 11 |
Query-log configuration, SIEM ingestion, retention settings, source-host attribution |
| DNSSEC (OMB M-08-23; SP 800-53 SC-20 and SC-21) |
M-08-23 required DNSSEC deployment to all applicable federal systems and all agency .gov domains signed by December 2009. SC-20 requires authoritative services to return origin-authentication and integrity artifacts and to support a chain of trust with child zones; SC-21 requires resolvers to request and perform that verification on the answers they receive |
Ch 03, Ch 06 |
Signed-zone inventory, DS publication, KSK and ZSK rollover records, resolver validation settings |
| Name and address resolution architecture (SP 800-53 SC-22) |
The systems that collectively provide name and address resolution must be “fault-tolerant and implement internal and external role separation” |
Ch 03, Ch 08 |
Architecture diagram, resolver redundancy, internal and external role separation |
| TIC 3.0 DNS policy enforcement point (CISA TIC 3.0 Security Capabilities Catalog) |
Five DNS PEP capabilities: domain name sinkholing; DNSSEC validation of agency clients’ lookups for internal and external domains; DNSSEC signing of all agency domains; monitoring for creation of or changes to agency domains; and CISA’s Protective DNS Service. A Web PEP capability, domain resolution filtering, prevents use of unauthorized resolvers over DoH |
Ch 03, Ch 05, Ch 06, Ch 11 |
RPZ and Protective DNS configuration, validation and signing evidence, domain-monitoring alerts, DoH blocking rules |
| IPv6 (OMB M-21-07) |
At least 20% of IP-enabled federal assets IPv6-only by the end of FY 2023, 50% by the end of FY 2024 and 80% by the end of FY 2025 |
Ch 07 |
Dual-stack and IPv6-only address plans, DHCPv6 and router advertisement governance, AAAA coverage |
| Email authentication (CISA BOD 18-01) |
Valid SPF on all second-level domains; DMARC on all second-level domains, at p=reject on all second-level domains and mail-sending hosts by October 16, 2018, with CISA as an aggregate-report recipient |
Appendix A |
DMARC, SPF and DKIM records per domain; aggregate report review |
| Asset inventory (SP 800-53 CM-8; CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model) |
An inventory of system components that accurately reflects the system, includes all components and is reviewed and updated |
Ch 01, Ch 07, Ch 11 |
IPAM discovery reports, CMDB reconciliation results |
| Audit, change and access control (SP 800-53 AU-2, AU-6, AU-12, CM-3, AC-2, AC-3, AC-6) |
Logged, reviewed, change-controlled, role-based and least-privilege administration of DNS, DHCP and IPAM |
Ch 03, Ch 09, Ch 11, Appendix A |
Change logs and approvals, role and scope assignments, review records |
| Secure DNS deployment (NIST SP 800-81 Rev. 3) |
Guidance, not a mandate: employ protective DNS wherever feasible; encrypt internal and external DNS traffic wherever feasible; deploy DNSSEC; use dedicated DNS servers. It describes an organization’s DNS service as “both an information source for policy decision points or policy creation and a policy enforcement point” |
Ch 03 – Ch 11 |
The evidence checklist in Chapter 11 |
| Cloud service certification (FedRAMP) |
Any cloud-delivered management plane needs FedRAMP certification at the right level, and the agency authorizes its own system that uses it; an agency “should never create a standalone authorization to operate for a cloud service offering” |
Ch 03, Ch 12, Appendix C |
FedRAMP Marketplace listing, the agency’s ATO for its own DDI system, boundary diagram |